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The Accident of Efficiency: Foreign
Exchanges, American Depository Receipts,
and Space Arbitrage
BRIAN P. MURRAY AND MAURICE PESSOt
INTRODUCTION

Starting in the 1930s, Congress enacted numerous laws
to protect the public from misrepresentations concerning
publicly traded securities. However, because there are
limited resources available to government watchdogs and
individual losses are often too small to make a private
action feasible, a class action often offers the only meaningful enforcement and means of redress for violations of these
laws for private litigants.2 In the past decade, the
emergence of the Internet has created a global marketplace
for securities where information is transmitted instantaneously all over the world.3 With the increasing

t Mr. Murray, B.A., University of Notre Dame (1983); M.A., University of Notre
Dame (1986); J.D., cum laude, St. John's University School of Law (1990), is a
member of Rabin, Murray & Frank LLP. Mr. Pesso, B.A., State University of
New York at Binghamton (1997); J.D., Boston University School of Law (2000),
is an associate at Rabin, Murray & Frank LLP.
1. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm, 78a-78mm (2001).
2. See Class Action JurisdictionAct of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3789 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1998) (testimony of Stanley M. Grossman, Senior Partner, Pomerantz
Haudek Block Grossman & Gross LLP); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) ("[Implied private actions
provide 'a most effective weapon in the enforcement' of the securities laws and
are 'anecessary supplement to Commission action.' ") (quoting J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)); In re Arakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 95CV-3431, 2001 WL 1590512, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001) ("[Alctions for
violations of the securities laws are often viable only through the economies of
scale of a class action....").
3. Not only does the Edgar SEC filing system offer on-line access to most
SEC filings (http://www.sec.gov), but most press releases issued by companies
are available either at the firm's website, or at a financial website such as
Yahoo.
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transnationalization of securities markets,4 securities fraud

now reaches investors both domestically and abroad.5 Thus,
this poses the question of whether foreign investors should
be included as class members in securities class action
litigation in the United States.
The threshold consideration in determining the scope of
the class is whether the federal securities laws provide for
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs or
purchases made on foreign exchanges. In making this
determination, the efficiency of the market for the stock at
issue will often be a dispositive factor. In a fraud case, if the
market is not sufficiently efficient, i.e., it does not quickly
absorb and reflect new information, the presumption of
reliance on the integrity of the market may not apply, class
certification is denied, and for all practical purposes, the
victim of the misrepresentations is without a meaningful
remedy.6
Securities that trade on the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") trade in sufficiently efficient markets for class
certification purposes. 7 However, many foreign exchanges
are not considered efficient markets. Therefore, the
efficiency of foreign exchanges and the propriety of
including purchasers on such foreign exchanges in the

4. Globalization of securities markets occurs as securities transactions
involve issuers of different nationalities, transactions that are executed in more
than one country, or securities purchasers and sellers that reside in more than
one country. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market:
Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2502 (1997).
5. "Illegal activities causing securities fraud can span two or more
continents, and litigants can include foreign nationals and corporations. The
varieties of transnational securities fraud are limitless, and only the facts of
each particular case lead to the characterization of a given transaction as
'transnational.' " Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of TransnationalSecurities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction,
30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 679, 679-80 (1999).
6. "[In the context of a claim for secondary market securities fraud, this
device [class action] is virtually meaningless without having fraud-on-themarket substitute for actual reliance." Trafton v. Deacon Barclays de Zoete
Wedd Ltd., No. C-93-2758-FMS, 1994 WL 746199, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,
1994).
7. See In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., No. 988258-CIV, 2001 WL 899658, at *1
(S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001) ("It is well-settled that investors in an efficient market
are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance, and Defendants make no
argument that the NYSE was not an efficient market."); see also Serfaty v. Int'l
Automated Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 418, 421 (D. Utah 1998) (presuming of market
efficiency is well-suited to stocks traded in national markets such as the NYSE).
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class, as well as the propriety of conferring subject matter
jurisdiction over such purchasers on foreign exchanges, is a
matter of debate.
It is the authors' contention that when a stock trades on
an efficient domestic exchange, arbitrageurs will force an
inefficient foreign exchange into an accident of efficiency
with regard to that stock, even if that foreign exchange is
not efficient with regard to its other listed stocks. Thus, if a
stock trades both domestically and abroad, and the
domestic exchange is efficient, any misstatement disseminated that affects the domestic market will affect the
stock abroad. Therefore, for purposes of conferring subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims of purchasers on foreign
exchanges, conduct in the United States that inflates the
price on a U.S. exchange necessarily causes inflated prices
and, thus, compensable losses, for purchasers on foreign
exchanges. Such conduct in the United States that directly
causes losses to foreign exchange purchasers should be
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subject matter
jurisdiction under the federal securities laws. Likewise,
given the unity of information with which the foreign and
domestic markets now trade, and the effect each exchange
has on the pricing of the other exchange, the purchasers on
the foreign exchanges should also be entitled to the
presumption of reliance on an efficient market.
I. THE "INEVITABLE LINK": EFFICIENT MARKETS AND SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION FOR FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS

A. The Importance of Efficient Markets in Proving Securities
Fraud Claims Under 10(b)
1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis. The Efficient
Market Hypothesis states that at any given time, security
prices fully reflect all available information.8 "An 'efficient'

8. See Eugene Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS
J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 56. The efficient market hypothesis evolved in the 1960s
from the doctoral dissertation of Eugene Fama. Dr. Fama previously made the
argument that in an active market that includes many well-informed and
intelligent investors, securities will be appropriately priced and reflect all
available information. If a market is perfectly efficient, no information or
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market is defined as a market where there are large
numbers of rational profit-maximizers actively competing,
with each trying to predict future market values of
individual securities and where important current
information is almost freely available to all participants." In
efficient markets such as the NYSE and the Nasdaq,
competition among many intelligent participants leads to a
situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of
individual securities already reflect the effects of
information based both on events that have already
occurred and on events which, as of now, the market
expects to take place in the future.9 If the market for the
stock in which the stock trades is efficient, then any false
statement disseminated in that market presumably affects
the prices of the stock. Thus, in relying on the market to
set a fair lprice, the purchaser is injured by any false
statement.

2. Factorsin Evaluating the Efficiency of the Market for
an Individual Stock. In evaluating whether the market for
an individual stock is sufficiently efficient, courts have
looked to a number of factors.11 One of the most influential
decisions in this regard is Cammer v. Bloom," where the
court identified five factors relevant to the determination of
market efficiency: (1) the stock's average trading volume;
(2) the number of analysts that followed and reported on
the stock; (3) the number of market makers; (4) eligibility to

analysis can be expected to result in the out-performance of an appropriate
benchmark.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., In re Res. Am. Sec. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 177, 188 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
("Typically, courts look at a number of factors in determining whether or not a
market is efficient. While there is no definitive list, the court in Cammer v.
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989), listed five factors which lead to the
presumption that there is an efficient market."); O'Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D.
479, 502-03 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("If a plaintiff can empirically demonstrate that
stock prices regularly rose or fell in prompt response to market information,
this fact would be significant in establishing an efficient market."); Simpson v.
Specialty Retail Concepts, 823 F. Supp. 353, 354 (M.D.N.C. 1993) ("This court
finds the Cammer factors instructive and will follow its lead."); Cammer, 711 F.
Supp. at 1286-87 (holding there are five factors that are relevant for the
purpose of determining whether an over-the-counter market is open and
efficient).
12. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
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file an S-3 Registration Statement; 13 and (5) the reaction of
the stock price to unexpected news events. 4 Other courts
have applied additional factors, including the capitalization
of the company, the bid-ask spread of the stock, and the
percentage of stock held by insiders. 5
3. Requirements for a Fraud Action Under Section
10(b): Presumption of Reliance. To state a claim under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange
Act"), a plaintiff must allege that, in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with
scienter, made a false material representation or omitted to
disclose material information and that plaintiffs reliance
on defendant's actions caused him injury.
The idea of an efficient market plays an important role
in alleging and proving fraud claims in class action cases
brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. In class
action securities litigation, where there may be thousands
of individual plaintiffs, the reliance element of section 10(b)
would ordinarily be the most cumbersome element to prove.
However, in these cases, the reliance element of the fraud
claim is usually supplied by the presumption of reliance for
a "fraud on the market."" The fraud on the market theory
obviates the need to prove subjective reliance because of the

13. Forms S-1, S-2, and S-3 provide a basic framework for the registration of
securities under the Securities Act. The same information is required to be part
of Securities Act registration statements in all categories, either presented in,
or delivered with, the prospectus or incorporated by reference from another
document. Form S-3 relies on the efficient market theory and thus allows
maximum use of incorporation by reference of Exchange Act reports and
requires minimal disclosure in the prospectus. For an issuer to file an S-3
registration statement, the current eligibility rules require the aggregate
market value for the voting stock held by non-affiliates to be $75 million or
more (for a primary offering of stock for cash). See Form S-3, General
Instruction B1. "The rationale for abandoning the prospectus delivery and
allowing incorporation by reference works only if the issuer is followed by a
sufficient analysts so that its public statements may move its market price."
John Coffee, Securities Act Reform: Of Babes and the Bath, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15,
2001, at pg. 8.
14. See Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
15. Serfaty v. Int'l Automated Sys., 180 F.R.D. 418, 423 (D. Utah 1998).
16. See Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588,
593 (2001).
17. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
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interposition of an efficient market between the buyer and
seller.18
The Supreme Court, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, summed
up the fraud on the market theory as such:
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market
does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most
publicly available information is reflected in market price, an
investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations,
9
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.'

Investors are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
reliance under the fraud on the market theory because "in
an efficient market the misinformation directly affects the
stock prices at which the investor trades and thus, through
the inflated or deflated price, causes injury even in the
absence of direct reliance."20
In an efficient market the fraud on the market theory
dispenses with the direct reliance requirement and instead
presumes that each class member relied on the integrity of
the market when buying a particular security.2' The fraud
on the market presumption is a critical factor in getting the
class certified since proving individual subjective reliance is
often so cumbersome as to make the prosecution of the
claim as a class action unmanageable. However, when a
stock trades simultaneously on both an efficient domestic
18. See id. at 247.
19. Id. Put another way, no one "would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked
crap game." Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
20. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42).
21. See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986). Another court
stated "[tihe fact that a purchaser may have also considered a number of other
factors in making his decision to purchase does not render him subject to a
unique defense, so long as he substantially or significantly relied upon either
the challenged statements or the integrity of the market." In re AM Int'l, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 190, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Grossman v. Waste
Mgmt., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 781, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("[I]f plaintiff relied on
statements of third parties that merely reiterated, digested, or reflected the
misstated information that forms the basis of the securities fraud claims, the
plaintiff has not relied on 'factors wholly extraneous to the market.' "). "The
market price of stock is taken to be the basis for investment decisions; because
the price reflected all available information, investors are presumed to have
been misled by the nondisclosure." Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 27
(1st Cir. 1987).
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market and a foreign market that may be inefficient in

relation to other stocks, courts have questioned the subject
matter jurisdiction and the propriety of class certification
for the purchasers on the foreign exchange.22

4. American Depository Receipts. Some investors desire
to diversify their portfolios with international equities.
"This demand for a medium for international investment,
as well as the attractiveness of the United States equity
market to foreign private companies, was the impetus for
the development of American Depository Receipts (ADR)."23
An ADR is a negotiable security quoted in U.S. dollars and
traded freely on domestic exchanges. A foreign company
deposits shares of its stock with a depository in the United
States and American investors are issued receipts (the
ADRs) for these shares.24 To the investor, there is no
difference between purchasing an ADR and shares of a
domestic corporation's stock, except for the country of origin
of the shares underlying an ADR." However, when a stock
22. The court in Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th
Cir. 1990) explained:
The fraud on the market theory cannot be applied logically to securities
that are not traded in efficient markets. An inefficient market, by
definition, does not incorporate into its price all the information about
the security. Investors, therefore, cannot be presumed to rely
reasonably on the integrity of the market of a security that is traded in
such a market.
23. See Travis A. Wise, American Depository Receipts, at http://www.
twise.com/writings/adr.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003); see also Pinker v. Roche
Holdings Ltd., 292 F.2d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[ADRs] offered significant
benefits to foreign companies, allowing them to tap into the American capital
market. They have since become one of the preferred methods for trading
foreign securities in the United States, with the value of ADRs bought and sold
annually in the hundreds of billions.")
24. See generally Mark A. Saunders, American Depository Receipts: An
Introduction to U.S. CapitalMarkets for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 48 (1993).
25. "ADRs are, in substance, 'receipts' issued by a domestic bank for shares
of foreign corporations that have been deposited in an overseas bank. The
'receipts' can then be traded in the United States without any of the
complications that ordinarily arise because of currency conversions and customs
requirements." Nomura Secs. Int'l, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 81 N.Y.2d 614, 616
(N.Y. 1993). The SEC regulates ADRs. These regulations ensure investors that
the securities which they are buying are regulated according to a standard with
which they are familiar, regardless of the country from which the security
originated. Therefore, while shares of a public foreign corporation can be traded
simultaneously on both foreign and domestic exchanges (as an ADR), there is
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trades simultaneously on both a foreign and domestic
exchange, a situation is created where some investors
bought their shares in efficient domestic markets and some
in foreign markets where efficiency may be questionable.
When confronted with whether these transactions on
foreign exchanges confer subject matter jurisdiction under
the federal securities laws, the Second Circuit, in Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone,Inc.,26 stated that courts must consider the
policy question of "whether Congress would have wished
the precious resources of the U.S. courts to be devoted to
them rather than leave the problem to the foreign country."
However, when a case involves securities traded on both
domestic and foreign exchanges, the resource allocation
dilemma is of little concern. If U.S. courts choose to allocate
resources in a securities class action case brought on behalf
of domestic investors, foreign investors who bought shares
of the same company on a foreign exchange should also be
included as class members. The "precious resources" of U.S.
courts are already being expended on the case, regardless of
whether foreign purchasers are included. However, the
burden on federal courts is only one consideration, and
subject matter jurisdiction for foreign transactions is
usually vigorously contested.
II. TESTS FOR SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
PLAINTIFFS

While courts agree that the reach of anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws is quite broad27 and
that Congress provided little or no guidance as to the
extraterritorial application of anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act,28 there is considerable debate over just how
often more information available to the U.S. investor. The more information
that is required and available, the more likely the stock price will reflect the
true value of the holding.
26. 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. See, e.g., Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 986.
28. See SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("The
Congress has not indicated clearly whether section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is applicable to cases involving predominately foreign
securities transactions effected to some degree from outside the United
States."); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that Congress provided "little meaningful guidance on the issue" of
extraterritorial application of federal securities laws); Robinson v. TCI/US W.
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far United States jurisdiction extends. While the federal
securities laws are silent as to their extraterritorial
application,29 there is copious case law on the issue of
foreign application of subject matter jurisdiction. Courts
have traditionally applied two tests, the "conduct test" and
"effects test," for determining whether it is appropriate to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims under
federal securities laws between foreign parties and/or
involving extraterritorial transactions.'

In an influential

trilogy of cases, the Second Circuit established the
"conduct" test and the "effects" test to determine subject
matter jurisdiction.3 From therein, most circuits have
adopted some variation of the Second Circuit tests in
deciding if U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction in
cases involving foreign plaintiffs.
A. The Effects Test
The effects test was first explained in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook.12 In Schoenbaum, Aquitaine Corporation, a
Canadian corporation, acquired Banff Oil Ltd. ("Banff'),
also a Canadian corporation. Banff shares were traded on
both the American Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock
Exchange. Aquitaine purchased Banff treasury shares in
Canada at market prices on the Toronto Stock Exchange at
a time when it knew and withheld information concerning
Comm. Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997) (remarking that the plaintiffs
allegations required the court "to confront the rather nebulous issue of the
extent to which the American securities laws may be applied extraterritorially...."). One court stated:
If the text of the 1934 Act is relatively barren, even more so is the
legislative history. Fifty years ago, Congress did not consider how far
American courts should have jurisdiction to decide cases involving
predominantly foreign securities transactions with some link to the
United States. The web of international connections in the securities
market was then not nearly as extensive or complex as it has become.
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
29. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991); MCG, Inc. v.
Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
30. See generally Paul Hamilton, The ExtraterritorialReach of the United
States Securities Laws Towards Initial Public Offerings Conducted over the
Internet, 13 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 343, 351-52 (1998).
31. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993; IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015-18
(2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1335-38 (2d Cir. 1972).
32. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc).
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the value of Banffs oil holdings. 3 Subsequently, an
American shareholder who purchased Banff treasury
shares on the American Stock Exchange brought a
derivative action in the United States to recover the loss
allegedly suffered by Banff when Aquitaine purchased
Banffs treasury shares at undervalued prices.
The district court dismissed the action, holding that the
Exchange Act did not apply to a foreign transaction
between foreign buyers and sellers. 3' The Second Circuit
reversed. The court reasoned, "Congress intended the
Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign
securities on American exchanges and to protect the
domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities. 36' As a result,
the court held that:
[T]he district court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations
of the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions which
are alleged to violate the Act take place outside the United States,
at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed
on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the
interests of American investors.

In deciding whether American investors were harmed,
the court found that if Banff received insufficient consideration for its stock, the equity of its shareholders was
adversely affected and the value of shares traded on the
American Stock Exchange was therefore reduced. The court
noted that:
This impairment of the value of American investments by sales by
the issuer in a foreign country, allegedly in violation of the
[Exchange] Act, has in our view, a sufficiently serious effect upon
United States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for
the protection of American investors and consideration of the
merits of plaintiffs claim.38

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

204-05.
205.
206.
208.
208-09.
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Thus, according to Schoenbaum, an American federal
court has subject matter jurisdiction under section 10(b)
when foreign conduct has a negative effect on American
investors.
B. The Conduct Test
The conduct test was first introduced in Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.3 9 Leasco involved
an American corporation listed on the London Stock
Exchange." The case arose due to the significant
misrepresentations made by Leasco in the United States
that artificially inflated the price of Leasco shares on the
London Stock Exchange.4 ' In deciding whether an American
plaintiff had adequately alleged subject matter jurisdiction,
the court noted "it was understood from the outset that all
the transactions would be executed in England," but asked
whether, "if Congress had thought about the point, it would
not have wished to protect an American investor if a
foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently
induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad-a
purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace."42
Judge Friendly used the "essential link" concept to
decide if the assertion of jurisdiction would run counter to
foreign relations law. 3 In Leasco, "abundant misrepresentations" were made in the United States, including meetings
in New York and telephone calls and letters to New York
that were an 'essential link' in inducing the plaintiff to
sign (in the United States) the merger documents which, in
turn, acted as an "essential link" in leading the plaintiff to
make the market purchases. Thus, it did not matter where
39. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. The stock was not traded in the United States.
41. The negotiations were held in New York and England over an extended
duration. They were in the context of a possible merger transaction in which
the defendants allegedly made misstatements about the financial condition and
performance of Pergamon Press Ltd. Id. at 1330-33.
42. Id. at 1337.
43. Id. at 1335. While the United States may have the authority to prescribe
the conduct of its nationals everywhere in the world, Congress has not done so.
Leasco noted that the ultimate, outside assertion of power was determined by
due process. Id. at 1334. In determining subject matter jurisdiction, the "essential link" concept is an objective test that looks at the circumstances that
induces the plaintiffs transaction, rather than the alleged misrepresentation or
omission. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
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the damages were felt. The court held that if an American
is injured in the purchase or sale of a security abroad when
an "essential link" to the defendant's fraud occurred in the
United States, an American district court has jurisdiction to
apply section 10(b) of the Exchange Act."
The court explained that "[t]he New Yorker who is the
object of fraudulent misrepresentations in New York is as
much injured if the securities are of a mine in
Saskatchewan as in Nevada."45 Judge Friendly concluded
that "[wihile, as earlier stated, we doubt that impact on an
American company and its shareholders would suffice to
make the statute applicable if the misconduct had occurred
solely in England, we think it tips the scales in favor of
applicability when substantial misrepresentations were
'
made in the United States."46
The core holdings of Leasco, however, are subject to
many interpretations. As the Second Circuit has said:
The circuits are divided as to precisely what sort of activities are
needed to satisfy the conduct test, although all agree that it is
based on the idea that Congress did not want 'the United States to
be used as a.base for manufacturing fraudulent security4 7devices
for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners.

The Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit
adhere to the more restrictive position-that the domestic
conduct must have been of "material importance" to or have
"directly caused" the alleged fraud.48 In contrast, the Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits generally require some lesser
quantum of conduct. 49 The Fifth Circuit has held "io

the

extent that these cases represent a common position, it

44. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1336.
45. Id. at 1336.
46. Id. at 1337.
47. Robinson v. TCI/US W. Comm., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975)).
48. Id. at 905.
49. See id. at 906; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding
that the test is whether "at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme occurs within this country"); Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac.
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that jurisdiction lies
where defendants used instrumentalities of interstate commerce and their
"conduct in the United States was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and
was significant with respect to its accomplishment"); Grunenthal GmbH v.
Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Continental Grain test).
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appears to be that the domestic conduct need be 5only
significant to the fraud rather than a direct cause of it." 1
C. ForeignPlaintiffs
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.5' was the first class
action case to address subject matter jurisdiction of foreign
plaintiffs. In Bersch, the company involved was IOS, a
Canadian company with its main offices in Switzerland.
Three simultaneous offerings were made of IOS stock: an
initial public offering underwritten by six firms to be sold to
foreigners in Europe, Asia, and Australia; 2 a secondary
offering in Canada, with no shares to be sold to Americans
residing in Canada; and a secondary offering sold by a
Bahamanian entity to people with relationships with IOS.
The latter prospectus provided that the shares "are not
being offered in the United States of America or any of its
territories or possessions or any area subject to its
jurisdiction."" After the shares became worthless, an
American who purchased shares despite restrictions placed
on such sales sued under section 10(b) for alleged false and
misleading statements in the prospectuses.54
A considerable amount of activity took place in New
York concerning the offerings. A number of meetings were
held in connection with the offerings; an American
accounting firm was retained to review IOS's operations;
the accounting firm met with the underwriters (two of
whom were American) to discuss the scope of its services;
preliminary discussions about discounts and commissions
on the offerings were held in New York; and parts of the
prospectuses were drafted in New York. In addition, the
proceeds of the sales were deposited in an account in New
York and a New York law firm represented the
underwriters and met with IOS. Furthermore, meetings
were held between underwriters and their counsel and the
SEC in New York.55 The Second Circuit held that these
activities were sufficient to allow jurisdiction under
50. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.
51. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
52. The prospectuses were to be delivered in those markets. Id. at 980.
53. Id. at 980 (quoting the prospectus).
54. Id. at 980-81. The prospectuses for the three offerings were essentially
the same insofar as the alleged misstatements.
55. Id. at 985 n.24.
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principles of foreign relations law, regardless of where the
effects were felt.56
The court then examined if Congress intended to assert
such jurisdiction. The court held that jurisdiction over the
claim of a foreign plaintiff was inappropriate because the
U.S. activities were merely preparatory to the offerings
(assuming the three could be treated as a single
underwriting) and "relatively small in comparison to those
abroad."57 The court further stated that because section
10(b) is limited to cases where "fraudulent acts...
committed abroad ... result in injury to purchasers or
sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an
interest,"58 a foreign citizen's claim would not be permitted
under these facts. However, the court explained that claims
asserted by American citizens (even those residing abroad)
would be heard, when any conduct, however preparatory,
was committed in the United States.59 Thus, the Bersch
Court provided that federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in
the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act)
of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans residing
abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material
importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; and
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures
to act)
6
within the United States directly caused such losses. 0

Therefore, under Bersch, an American plaintiff need
only show that the defendant's conduct "significantly
contributed" to his losses, while a foreign plaintiff must
56. Id. at 985.
57. Id. at 986-87.
58. Id. at 989.
59. Id. at 992. Bersch was a class action. As a result of its holding on
jurisdiction and the distinct treatment for foreign, as opposed to American
plaintiffs, the Second Circuit ordered that the class not include those who were
neither citizens nor residents of the United States. Id. at 995-97.
60. Id. at 993.
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show that the defendant's conduct "directly caused" the
loss. However, this distinction was discussed in lIT v.
Vencap, Ltd.,61 decided on the same day as Bersch. lIT held
that because the Second Circuit does "not think Congress
intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
when these are peddled only to foreigners," where
"fraudulent acts themselves," and not merely preparatory
activities, take place in the United States, a federal district
court has jurisdiction over section 10(b) actions of foreigners
in such circumstances."
While the courts mentioned above tried to set
guidelines for subject matter jurisdiction for foreign
plaintiffs, they could not have reasonably foreseen the
technological changes rapidly taking place. Issues of
"effect," "conduct," and "significant contribution" became
much harder to determine as the world moved toward a
broader global economy.
D. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC
1. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC: A Brief Summary.
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC 3 presented the Second Circuit
with a scenario where both the conduct and effects tests
were implicated. The defendant, Lep Group PLC, a Londonbased holding company,' had its common stock registered
in the United Kingdom and traded on the London Stock
Exchange.65 Its shares also traded as ADRs on the Nasdaq.66
Since its ADRs traded on the Nasdaq, Lep was subject to
the periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act.67
The plaintiff, Itoba Ltd., was a Channel Islands
company whose parent company was A.D.T. Ltd. ("ADT"), a
Bermuda company. ADT's shares traded on the NYSE and
approximately half of its shareholders of record resided in

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1017.
54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 120.
Id.
Each ADR represented five ordinary shares. Id.
Id.
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the United States." ADT was also the parent of A.D.T.
Securities Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation engaged in
the security services industry with National Guardian, a
Lep subsidiary, representing one of ADTs largest
competitors. 69 ADT owned shares in Lep and thus had a
small, indirect ownership interest in National Guardian."
After plans for a joint venture with Lep failed, ADT began
to purchase Lep ordinary shares on the London Stock
Exchange in order to increase its ownership interest in
National Guardian.71 ADT used its subsidiary Itoba to make
the stock purchases. In deciding to purchase Lep stock,
ADT relied on ADT's in-house financial analyst's review of a
Lep SEC filing72 and on a report prepared by a financial
adviser. 3 Before the acquisition was completed, Lep's stock
price collapsed, allegedly due to fraud, and the value of
Itoba's $114 million investment in Lep dropped by nearly
$111 million. 4
Thus, ADT, a foreign company, through Itoba, a foreign
off-shore subsidiary, was defrauded in purchasing Lep stock
(another foreign company) on the London Stock Exchange,
in part in reliance on Lep's required SEC filings in the
United States. Under the Schoenbaum "effects" test, there
was an insufficient effect in the United States to justify the
assertion of jurisdiction. However, the purchase of the stock
was caused in part, by the false SEC report, 5 and the
Second Circuit held that was conduct in the United States
because of the nature of ADRs. The court stated:
The ADRs were simply a grouping into one security of five
ordinary shares. Inevitably, there was a direct linkage between
the prices of the ADRs representing five ordinary shares and the
prices of the single ordinary shares themselves. If the ordinary

68. Id. The court does not specify what percentage of outstanding shares
was held by U.S. residents.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 121.
72. Id. The particular filing was an annual report on Form 20-F, which is a
foreign issuer's equivalent of a Form 10-K.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. Although Itoba's board did not read the report, Itoba was merely
a tool of ADT, which did read the report, and thus derivative reliance was
adequate. See id. at 122.
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share price fell on the London Exchange, the market 7rice of an
ADR would decrease in similar manner, and vice versa.

The court did not say whether the conduct involved was
enough to confer subject matter jurisdiction, but instead it
melded the conduct and effects tests, noting that "[t]here is
no requirement that these two tests be applied separately
and distinctly from each other. 7 7 The court explained that,
"indeed, an admixture or combination of the two often gives
a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an
American court."78 Using this formulation, the court found
that there was subject matter jurisdiction because
Lep's uncorrected nondisclosure [in SEC filings] played as much a
role in Itoba's purchases as the price listings on the London
Exchange and NASDAQ. In view of the deleterious effect this
continued nondisclosure had on the thousands of ADT
shareholders in the United States, it cannot be described correctly
as incidental or preparatory [to the fraud].79

2. Precedents Concerning Foreign Purchases. Itoba
dealt with American Depository Shares, which by their
nature are convertible into a different security traded on a
foreign exchange." But there is no reason why Itoba's view
on the interrelationship of markets should not apply
generally to securities that are not necessarily convertible,
such as shares of a Canadian company registered in the
United States. Even without ADRs, international
arbitrageurs do not allow the price of shares traded on a
foreign exchange to vary from the price offered in the
United States.8 This causes the "inevitable" link between
the price of ADRs traded in the United States and the
corresponding common stock traded abroad. If the stock is
traded on an efficient exchange in the United States
76. Id. at 123.
77. Id. at 122.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 124.
80. Id.
81. This is the classic sense of arbitrage: "The purchase of securities in one
market for immediate resale on another in order to profit from a price
discrepancy." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 121 (1st ed.
1984).
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(thereby reflecting all publicly available information in the
stock price), the stock will necessarily be trading on an
efficient exchange abroad, at least with regard to that one
stock. If the price at which it trades in the United States
reflects all publicly available information, and the prices in
the U.S. and abroad move in tandem, the price abroad will
reflect all publicly available information for that stock,
regardless of whether the foreign exchange is efficient with
regard to other stocks. Therefore, domestic conduct such as
filing documents with the SEC, which artificially inflates
prices on domestic exchanges, will necessarily inflate prices
abroad.
Unfortunately, the relatively straightforward reasoning
of Itoba is not always followed to its logical ends. For
instance, this was the case in, Kaufman v. Campeau Corp.,82
In re Laidlaw Securities Litigation4 3 and Nathan Gordon
Trust v. Northgate Exploration,Ltd.
3. Pre-ItobaDecisions. In Kaufman, the court examined
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over Canadians
who bought shares on Canadian exchanges. The majority of
defendants' actions took place in Canada, but they also filed
documents with the SEC and issued press releases in
America.85 The plaintiffs cited the "unitary nature of the
Canadian and domestic markets" in support of their
argument that the conduct test for subject matter
jurisdiction was satisfied. However, the court "fail[ed] to
discern how inclusion of alleged misrepresentations and
omissions in materials filed or circulated in the United
States could have played a significant role in any losses
sustained by the Canadian investors."86 The Kaufman court
either rejected the "inevitable link" between the prices on
the two exchanges as sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction or didn't think such a link existed.
In Laidlaw, the plaintiff sought to have a class certified
which included purchasers on the NYSE, Toronto Stock
Exchange, and Montreal Stock Exchange." The court

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

744 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Ohio. 1990).
No. 91-CV-1829, 1992 WL 68341 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1992).
148 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Kaufman, 744 F. Supp. at 810.
Id.
Laidlaw, 1992 WL 68341, at *1.
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refused to certify a class, which included purchasers on the
Toronto or Montreal Exchanges, and certified a class of
NYSE purchasers only.88 The court found that the named
plaintiff (a purchaser on the NYSE) had antagonistic
interests with the foreign purchasers. 9 According to the
court, while the American investor would have to show the
effect of the misrepresentations on the price of Laidlaw
stock on the NYSE to prevail at trial, he would have no
interest in demonstrating the effect of the misrepresentations on the foreign markets." The court held the
plaintiff would have no interest in demonstrating how the
alleged fraud affected the price of Laidlaw stock in
Montreal or Toronto: "As an American investor, [the
plaintiff] would naturally focus on the price changes on the
New York Stock Exchange; price fluctuations on the
Toronto and Montreal exchanges would be of little to no
importance to him."'" Further, while the efficiency of the
NYSE was uncontested, defendants argued that the
Canadian investors would have to show individual reliance
because the Montreal and Toronto exchanges were not
efficient for the purposes of the fraud on the market theory
and the plaintiff would have no interest in demonstrating
they were efficient.92
The fallacy of the Laidlaw Court's holding is premised
on the idea that the plaintiff would have had to do
something to demonstrate that the prices on the Toronto or
Montreal exchanges moved in response to the misrepresentations in America. In reality, the efficiency of the
NYSE, and the opportunity for space arbitrageurs to profit
if the foreign exchanges did not move in lockstep, would
have assured that the prices would move abroad if there
were misrepresentations made in America that affected the
88. Id. at *6.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The same logic was applied in Smith v. Dominion Bridge Corp., No.
CIV. A. 96-7580, 1998 WL 98998 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1998) with the same result.
In Smith, the plaintiff sought to represent a class of purchasers on both the
Vancouver Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. The court refused to certify a class of
purchasers on the Vancouver exchange, holding "[blecause Smith did not
purchase stock on the Vancouver Stock Exchange, he has no interest in
establishing the efficiency of the [VSE] ....Thus, unlike Smith, purchasers on

the Vancouver Exchange would have to establish individual reliance in their
purchasing decisions on the alleged misrepresentations ....
'Id. at *4.
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stock price in America. Thus, the plaintiff would have had
to do nothing to demonstrate prices moved on the Toronto
or Montreal exchanges in response to misrepresentations in
America.
In Nathan Gordon Trust v. Northgate Exploration,
Ltd.,93 the plaintiff, a United States trust which purchased
stock on the NYSE, sought to certify a class of purchasers of
Northgate Exploration stock on the NYSE, London,
Toronto, and Montreal exchanges. The defendants argued
that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over
purchasers on the foreign exchanges due to a lack of
conduct in the United States relating to the foreign
exchanges.94 The plaintiff alleged the conduct in the United
States-filing false and misleading statements with the
SEC-necessarily inflated the price on the foreign exchanges.95 The court did not directly address this argument
but apparently rejected it since it declined to include
purchasers on foreign exchanges in the class.96
4. Nathan Gordon Trust Revisited. Almost a decade
ago, the Nathan Gordon Trust court rejected plaintiffs
93. 148 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
94. Id. at 107-08. Prior to Itoba, the test for extraterritorial application of
the federal securities laws was either the conduct or effect test, whereas now a
lesser combination of the two tests may suffice. See Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122; see
also In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Eur. and Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d
118, 126 (2d Cir. 1998); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 663-64
(7th Cir. 1998); see generally Joseph P. Garland and Brian P. Murray, Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Under the Federal Securities Laws: The State of Affairs
after Itoba, 20 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 235 (1996).
95. The Itoba Court distinguished Nathan Gordon Trust on the grounds that
it involved class certification (which is discretionary) rather than subject matter
jurisdiction issues. 54 F.3d at 123. However, it seems that a court bound by
Itoba would have to decide the issue differently than did the Nathan Gordon
Trust Court. The Itoba Court did not explain why the exercise of discretion
would allow a different result.
96. Nathan Gordon Trust, 148 F.R.D. at 108-09. The argument that
domestic conduct and inflated prices on domestic exchanges causes inflated
prices on foreign exchanges was apparently not raised in McNamara v. Bre-X
MineralsLtd., 32 F. Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Tex. 1999). In McNamara,the plaintiffs
made seven arguments why the court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Canadian purchasers on a Canadian exchange, one of which was the filing of
false documents with the SEC. Id. at 924. However, plaintiffs failed to make the
final argument that the inflation on the Nasdaq inevitably caused inflation on
the Toronto exchange, and the court declined to find that any domestic conduct
"contributed to the losses of which they complain." Id. at 925.
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argument concerning the interrelationship between domestic and foreign exchanges. The plaintiffs theory in Nathan
Gordon Trust on "space arbitrageurs" unfortunately predated Itoba. With the advent of the Internet and the
undisputed globalization of the stock markets, the arguments posed in Nathan Gordon Trust are stronger than

ever.
While defendants in Nathan Gordon Trust argued that
shareholders who bought their shares on foreign exchanges
should not be included as class members, the plaintiff
argued otherwise. Plaintiffs rationale was as follows:
Given the free flow of information, any price discrepancies
between exchanges will quickly disappear to the price in the
efficient market. For example, even if the Montreal Exchange were
itself inefficient, if Company X sold for $10.00 on the Montreal
Exchange and $10.50 in New York, there would quickly be buyers
in Montreal who would buy at $10.00 there and sell at $10.50 in
New York. These are 'space arbitrageurs.'... But the lure of such
easy money would increase the demand for shares in Montreal,
which would raise the price; one who could buy in Montreal and
sell New York will do so as long as the price variance is no greater
than transaction costs (which are minimal), and if many are
seeking to buy in Montreal, the price will be bid up until the prices
in the two markets are in equilibrium. Although arbitrageinducted demand pressure will stop, the New York market,
awakened to the undervalued Montreal market, will continue to
buy in Montreal as long as that market values the stock below
$10.50. This increase in the demand in Montreal will eventually
cause the price to 97rise to the price of $10.50 set by the efficient
New York market.

Today, this theory is firmly supported by the fact that
the Internet facilitates the transmission of information all
over the world. It would only take seconds for someone in
New York to realize that Company X's shares were trading
for less on the Montreal Exchange than they were on the
NYSE. As plaintiffs counsel explained in Nathan Gordon
Trust, the prices on both exchanges (regardless of the
efficiency of the foreign exchange) would eventually be the
same. Due to advances in technology this equilibrium would
now be achieved in a fraction of the time it would have
97. See Nathan Gordon Trust v. Northgate Exploration Ltd., 91 Civ. 3937
(TPG), 21 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.) (Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Class
Certification) (on file with authors).
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taken 10 years ago. The inefficient market would almost
instantaneously match the price of the efficient market,
making the inefficient and efficient market in essence one
efficient market for all applicable purposes (class certification and subject matter jurisdiction).
5. Post-Itoba Cases. In recent years, it seems as if the
courts have begun to accept the idea of "space arbitrage"
and the interrelationship between efficient and inefficient
markets. For example, the court in In re Gaming Lottery
Securities Litigation9" rejected Nathan Gordon Trust and
followed Itoba, conferring subject matter jurisdiction over
Canadian purchasers on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In
that case, the plaintiffs alleged "a single fraudulent scheme
which included misstatements and omissions in both
countries and the inflation of GLC's [the defendants] stock
price on both the Canadian and American exchanges."99 The
court found that there was subject matter jurisdiction
"[d]ue to the efficiencies of market pricing and the everpresent possibility of arbitrage, the price of GLC stock on
the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq
100 unsurprisingly
moved in tandem during the class period.'
In contrast to Gaming Lottery, one court distinguished
Itoba on its facts and refused to find subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign transactions. In In re Baan Co.
Securities Litigation, the -stock was traded on domestic
and foreign exchanges, and the defendants contested
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs who
purchased on foreign exchanges. The court held that finding
subject matter jurisdiction on a fraud on the market theory
when a stock is traded domestically and abroad "would
extend the reach of the 1934 Act too far." ' 2 The court also
noted that finding subject matter jurisdiction "would allow
a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign defendant based on an
extraterritorial transaction whenever that foreign defendant had filed a fraudulently misleading document with
the SEC. 10 3 While the Baan Court was absolutely correct in

98. 58 F. Supp. 2d 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
99. Id. at 75.
100. Id.
101. 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 11.
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this statement, it failed to explain why such a holding
would run afoul of the conduct or effects tests (or a
combination of both). In fact, that scenario seems to
describe the facts of Itoba.
The Baan Court distinguished Itoba on the grounds
that the plaintiff in Itoba alleged a specific, if somewhat
indirect, chain of events showing that it relied on SEC
filings (satisfying part of the conduct test) and the
plaintiffs parent company was American (satisfying part of
the effects test), facts not present in the Baan case. 1 The
Baan plaintiffs made the argument that Baan shares
traded in tandem on the world markets, but they
apparently contended that this satisfied the effects test, not
the conduct test. Since the shares traded in tandem, the
value of Baan shares owned by Americans were affected by
the fraud."5 Relying on Bersch, the Baan Court rejected this
argument and held that the effects test only extends
jurisdiction to American plaintiffs who are affected." 6 The
Baan Court thus did not directly address the argument that
conduct in the United States (filing false and misleading
documents with the SEC) caused the injury to foreign
plaintiffs when stocks trade in tandem on world markets.
III. ORBITAL ENGINE: A CASE STUDY.

Cases like Itoba and Gaming Lottery take a seemingly

sound premise-space arbitrageurs will ensure that a stock
traded on multiple exchanges will move on both markets in
response to news-and follow it to the conclusion that there
is sufficient conduct to confer subject matter jurisdiction
over purchasers on foreign exchanges or that a foreign stock
trades on an efficient market abroad for purposes of class
certification. To test the validity of the premise, we consider
the case of Orbital Engine Corp. Ltd.
Orbital Engine was a large Australian company whose
stock was publicly traded on the Australian Stock Exchange
("ASX") for seven years before the initial public offering of
its ADRs on the NYSE." 7 The offering price on the NYSE
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Yahoo Finance, Profile - Orbital Engine Corporation Limited
(OEC.AX), at http://au.biz.yahoo.com/p/o/oec.ax.html (last visited May 9, 2003).

406

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

was predicated on the price in Australia, a mathematical
calculation based on the closing price of the stock on the
ASX on the day of the U.S. offering (due to time zone
differences, the ASX closed before the NYSE opened). The
1 meaning that the
stock was thinly traded in Australia,08
stock may not have been priced efficiently. If the ordinary
shares on the ASX were inefficiently priced, the initial
offering price in the United States would also be inefficient.
The ADRs opened on the NYSE at the Australian
equivalent of $4.92 9 on the NYSE (Orbital's closing price
that day in Australia), while Australian investors slept
during the Australian night." ° The traders on the NYSE bid
down the price of the ADRs to $4.30 by the time trading
closed on the NYSE on the first day. When the Australian
market woke up the next day (literally and figuratively),
they had no choice but to follow the price set by the NYSE;
the closing price on the ASX that day (while traders in New
York slept) was $4.48 (from $4.92 the previous day). 1
Over time, the trading volume on the NYSE exceeded
that of the ASX on a proportionate basis. In 1992, Orbital
had a trading volume of 42 million shares on the Australian
Stock Exchange and 2.67 million ADRs (representing 21.3
million shares) on the NYSE. In 1996, Orbital had
approximately 300 million shares outstanding and a volume
of 90 million shares on the ASX, for an annual turnover
rate of 30%.12 The ADRs, of which there are 3.4 million

108. Approximately 42 million shares of Orbital Engine were traded on the
Australian Stock Exchange in 1992, out of approximately 313 million shares
outstanding. Bloomberg database search (May 2, 2003) (on file with authors);
Orbital Engine Corp. Ltd., Prospectus, Dec. 4, 1991, at 6 (on file with authors).
109. For comparison purposes, prices reflect the per ordinary share price,
not the ADR price which is 8 times higher due to the 8:1 ratio for the ADRs. See
Orbital Engine Corp. Ltd., Prospectus, Dec. 4, 1991, at 1 (on file with authors).
110. There is a 13-hour time difference between Sydney and New York.
111. Cameron Stewart, Orbital Shares in Spiral After Wall St. Listing,
AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 6, 1991, at 19 ("The local share price of Mr. Ralph Sarich's
Orbital Engine Corp slumped by 9 percent yesterday after a disappointing
debut on the New York Stock Exchange.").
112. The turnover rate is the volume of shares traded as a percentage of a
company's listed shares. An annual turnover rate of 100% or more is indicative
of an efficient market. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989)
("Turnover measured by average weekly trading of two percent or more of the
outstanding shares would justify a strong presumption that the market for the
security is an efficient one....").

2003]
outstanding,1 13

407

ACCIDENT OF EFFICIENCY
had

volume

of 26.5

million

in

1996

(representing 212 million ordinary shares), for an annual
turnover rate of almost 800% on the NYSE. Orbital
Engine's turnover rate on the NYSE was almost 27 times
higher than on the ASX. The turnover rate, which is one of
the most important indicators in gauging the efficiency of
the market for a particular stock," clearly showed that
Orbital Engine shares traded efficiently on the NYSE.
The Orbital Engine case is an example of an efficient
exchange perhaps forcing another exchange (with
questionable efficiency) into an accident of efficiency. This
was helped in part by the difference in trading hours in the
exchanges involved. The inefficient market could not
exercise an effect on the efficient market during market
hours in New York, allowing traders in New York to set an
efficient price.
CONCLUSION
As financial markets move increasingly towards
globalization, more and more companies will be traded on
both domestic and foreign exchanges. Furthermore, the
public notice requirements of the Exchange Act enacted as
part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995,115 coupled with the Internet and e-mail, mean more

investors, including foreign purchasers on foreign
exchanges, will be aware of pending class actions and will
want to participate. Rather than allowing the United States
and its securities exchanges to be used as a base for
exporting fraud, courts should recognize that the
"inevitable linkage" between prices on efficient domestic
exchanges and foreign exchanges provides a basis for
conferring subject matter jurisdiction over purchasers on
foreign exchanges. Further, purchasers on foreign
exchanges should be entitled to the presumption of reliance
due to the fraud on the market theory when certifying
classes.

113. Representing 27.2 million common shares. Orbital Engine Corp. Ltd.,
Prospectus, Dec. 4, 1991, at 1 (on file with authors).
114. See Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).

